MILLION-DOLLAR MOUNTAINS: PRICES, SANCTIONS, AND
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE SOCIAL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
JASON ScoTrJOHNSTONt
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world where every aspect of the natural environment is
up for cash sale or lease. Imagine that every lake and river, every
environmental good, even those held in collective ownership, is freely
exchangeable for money. Suppose also that in this world, any human
relationship may be created, or ended, if enough money is paid.
Friendships and marriages are bought and sold, like so many commodities, using the common medium of exchange, money. Would
we think it odd in such a world to express our valuation of every
relationship, both among human beings and between human beings
and the nonhuman environment, in terms of dollars? Would we not,
in such a world, speak of our million-dollar mountain, our six-figure
friend?
I believe that in this still-hypothetical world, we would indeed use
dollars to value all our relationships. Further, it is only because our
current social and legal practices disapprove and even sanction attempts to exchange money for some relationships that we would find
it unusual and objectionable to speak in such terms. We refuse to
value some goods in dollar terms because the "goods" are relationships, much of the value of which would be lost were we to allow the
free exchange of such relationships for money. It is not that we
compartmentalize ourselves into family member versus consumer,
consumer versus worker, worker versus citizen, able to rank and
compare alternative jobs but completely unable to say whether a
higher income is worth less than time with one's children. It is not
that our diverse values are incommensurable. It is, instead, that we
do not think that money is the appropriate medium in which to
express these values. The task is to explain why this should be so in
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order to understand the choice among alternative legal approaches to
regulating and preserving collective social and environmental goods.
In this Article, I take some preliminary steps in such a direction
by developing a functional, economic account of how money-price
allocation of certain kinds of relationships is likely to result in the
eventual destruction of the value inherent in those relationships.
This account is developed first by thinking through what might be
lost were relationships among human beings, such as friendship and
marriage, to be freely exchangeable for money. Crucially, a restriction on money exchange is not equivalent to a restriction on all exchanges. Rather, restricting money exchange forces delayed, bartered exchange. For barter to occur, the parties must possess attributes that they value without regard to the value these goods might
bring in some other relationship. The delayed, bartered reciprocity
that characterizes our closest personal relationships is how we learn to
trust and to cooperate. Learning to trust and cooperate is both costly,
and, if effective, vulnerable to exploitation. Legal and social sanctions against attempts to contract out of reciprocity by arranging
money exchanges for the services that are typically exchanged in such
relationships are justified on efficiency grounds. Such sanctions
reduce outside opportunities which both lessen the incentive to learn
how to cooperate and increase the incentive to exploit cooperative
behavior.
This functional explanation of exchange-restricted human relationships may be extended to provide a new economic perspective on
the legal regulation of our interaction with the nonhuman environment. The "tragedy of the commons"'-the tendency for free, collective environmental goods to be degraded by pollution and overusearises only when a collective environmental resource is provided as a
free good. Economists have complained for decades that the environmental problem is simple, that all we need to do to cure the pollution problem is to attach appropriate prices, and that the failure to do
so is simply a political failure caused by the enormous redistributive
effects that such pricing would have. That such redistributive effects
are an important explanation of actual legislative and regulatory
practice in the United States is clear. The practice, however, has not
been to treat collective environmental goods as free, but rather to
regulate directly how such goods are used and to sanction impermissible uses. Under my approach, the question is why we use sanctions

Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
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2
rather than prices in regulating such goods. The answer, I believe, is
that the regime of sanctions is justified precisely by the need to overcome the collective-action problem by creating an incentive for both
individual monitoring of use by others, and individual sensitivity to
the effect of one's use on others. We regulate use not because we are
certain of the collective impact of alternative types and levels of individual interaction with the environment, but rather because we are
not. Because of that same uncertainty, we prefer sanctions to pricing
due to our certainty that a use should not be permitted only if it is a
gross departure from, or completely unlike, those uses that experience has indicated are generally protective of the environment. We
use sanctions because environmental regulation is intended to preserve the diversity, variability, and duration, not of the natural environment, but of human relationships with it. We use sanctions,
finally, because we do not want to create incentives for our collective
agents to derive revenues from increases in the level of harmful activities, but to detect levels and uses that threaten too much harm.

I. ARE VALUES INCOMMENSURABLE, OR IS MONEY THE PROBLEM?

In the legal and philosophical literature, incommensurability has
been understood to refer to at least three notions. The first, what
Ruth Chang calls incomparability, is the idea that certain goods cannot be compared or ordinally ranked.s The second, related sense is
the idea that all goods cannot be valued according to a single common metric.4 This second sense is equivalent to saying that we cannot
come up with a cardinal utility scale along which all goods may be
ranked. The third and final sense, emphasized by Margaret Radin, is

The prices-versus-sanctions framework was set out first in Robert Cooter, Prices
and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523-24 (1984). See also Thomas C. Schelling,
Prices as Regulatoy Instruments, in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTON 1, 6-7
(Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1985) (explaining that, while no moral prejudice attaches
to the action for which a fee is paid, payment of a fine or sanction does not erase the
offense).
s See Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILrlY, AND
2

PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). For an illustrative discussion and
application of incomparability, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 55-59 (1993).
4 This is the sense of incommensurability employed in Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 780 (1994).
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that we either cannot or should not compare some actions or choices
in terms of money prices or returns. 5
As I have put them, the first two related meanings of incommensurability are badly incomplete. I have not specified what it means to
say that we "cannot" rank all goods along a common ordinal or cardinal scale. One possibility is that by saying we cannot come up with
such a ranking, one means that it is conceptually or logically impossible to do so. As a logical matter, it makes no sense to ask whether a
particular complex number is larger or smaller than an arbitrary real
number, because the very definition of real and complex numbers
makes such a comparison meaningless: Complex numbers are not
defined on the real line. So too, one might argue, it would make no
sense to ask whether being a loving parent is better or worse than
having an additional ten million dollars. Our conception of what it
means to be a loving parent does not allow us to compare this good
with a certain amount of money.
But just as there are many number systems, so too are there many
alternative conceptions of both money and human relationships. At
bottom, any assertion that it is conceptually or logically impossible to
rank ordinally or cardinally alternative goods is an assertion that, as
constructed by us, the goods cannot be ranked meaningfully. Thus, as
Cass Sunstein explicitly has noted, incommensurability (in either the
ordinal or cardinal sense) is an assertion about "widespread current
attitudes " 6 regarding how we value things: that reducing values to a
single, unitary metric is "inconsistent with prevailing convictions" and
contemporary experience. This makes incommensurability a behavioral claim, but like any behavioral claim, incommensurability is, of
course, fully amenable to philosophical exploration. One might
argue that our conception of value implies that all items of potential
value are subject to some sort of order relationship (even if partial).
This would amount to a conceptual refutation of incommensurability.
Although the literature on incommensurability may be unclear in
the abstract about what is meant by the term, it provides plenty of
concrete examples! These examples reveal incommensurability to be
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 118-22 (1996); see also
Kenneth J. Arrow, Invaluable Goods, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 757, 758-59 (1997)
5

(analyzing Radin's arguments).
6 Sunstein, supra note 4,
at 790.
7 Id. at 798.

a For examples of what is meant by the term "incommensurability," see Sunstein,
supra note 4, at 782-85, discussed infra text accompanying notes 9-10, and Richard A.
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a hypothesis about the undesirability of exchanging certain sorts of
relationships, or aspects thereof, for money.
This is true of both critics and defenders of incommensurability.
For instance, to demonstrate the plurality of incommensurable values
and diverse valuation, Sunstein (who may be given due credit for
getting the legal incommensurability ball rolling) adduces the following examples: If one offers to pay a neighbor or friend cash to mow
one's lawn or to compensate the friend for forgiving one's cancellation of lunch, then the neighbor or friend will be insulted, regardless
of how much one offers;9 our sense of awe and wonder upon viewing
a mountain cannot be expressed by saying that the mountain is worth
a certain (large) amount of money; finally, one would be a "strange
creature" if one actually thought about dating and romance as participating in a marriage market."0 In his penetrating critique of incommensurability and defense of the utility metric as an explanatory
tool, Richard Epstein discusses an example put forward by Joseph
Raz. In the example, a husband takes ajob paying an extra $100,000
but requiring that he live in a distant city, apart from his spouse. As
characterized by Epstein, Raz argues that if the husband takes the job,
then this does not imply that the husband believes an additional
$100,000 somehow can be judged more valuable than living with his
spouse." According to Raz, the value of an extra $100,000 is incommensurable with the value of living with one's spouse. Epstein finds
that this ignores the likely interdependence between the husband's
and the wife's utility functions, a formalization, if you will, of our
2
notion of what it means to love another person. Epstein finds it
"inconceivable" that the husband would make the decision to take the
distant job without consulting his wife, and without sharing the additional $100,000 with her. 3 On this view, the question of whether the
husband's decision to take the job indicates that he values $100,000

Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, oils Utility the Ruler of the WorldW, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
683, 691-94 (discussing a parent's choice to work late and miss her child's band

concert, to work overseas for an increased salary or professional advancement, or to
take an out-of-town job that requires separation from her family).
9 See Sunstein, supranote 4, at 785-86.
"Id. at 816.
" See Epstein, supra note 8, at 693-94 (discussing Raz's example); see also Margaret
Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability,43 DuKE L.J. 56, 65-67 (1993) (same).
12 See Epstein, supra note 8, at 696 ("In dealing with a familial situation, [Raz]
stressed the question of incommensurability of values but ignored the more important
and pressing question of interdependent utility functions.").
"3See id.
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more than time with his wife becomes "impossible" to ask; rather, the
proper question is whether the husband and wife have "made other
side transactions, present or future, so that the increment in wealth
produces gains in utility to both of them4in a fashion consistent with
family affections and family obligations."
What is most striking about these examples is that they all play
upon the readers' shared intuitive sense that it is wrong to think in
terms of exchanging money for some other valuable relationship or
even to think of the formation of some relationships in terms of the
"market" or "exchange" metaphor. For many of those who have any
experience of college fraternity and sorority social life, however, the
idea that dating and courtship are institutions of the marriage market-and that participants would be well-advised to recognize that
they are part of a market-might well seem unremarkable. That the
sense of awe and wonder provoked by our great Western mountains,
rivers, and plains is not translatable into dollar terms would come as a
surprise to real estate agents in the Rocky Mountain region, who have
spent the last decade busily consolidating vast and hugely expensive
private ranch lands. 5 It may be uncommon for one neighbor to offer
to pay another to mow her lawn, but it would be equally uncommon
for the neighbor not to offer to pay her neighbor's son or daughter to
do thejob. In fact, many cultures require friends to make money gifts
to each other on important religious and family occasions. 1 That a
husband would fail to consult his wife before taking a distant job, or
that he would view his incremental salary as "his" money rather than
as a joint possession, would hardly come as a surprise, I suspect, to
many American wives and ex-wives.
The utility-maximization approach is, as Epstein argues, very
flexible, and can be employed to explain the behaviors in all of these
examples. Yet the issue they raise is not whether a particular behavior
is or is not consistent with utility maximization, but rather why we
should feel that the hypothesized ways of thinking about alternative
actions are socially undesirable. We may agree with Epstein that it is

Id. at 697.
"See, e.g., Andr~e Brooks, "Paradise"Seekers Drive up House Prices, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
29, 1992, § 10, at 5 (reporting a real estate "boom" in Idaho); Tim Cornwell, Cappucdno Cowboys Turn West Mild OBSERVER (London), Aug. 13, 1995, at 18 (discussing the
'4

"suburbanisation of the American West").
16 See

VIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 82-118 (1994)

(recounting such practices among Jews and other early-20th-century American immigrant groups, and in contemporary Japanese culture).
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socially desirable for husband and wife to form bonds of interdependence, and that interdependent utilities may formalize such
bonds in a useful way; nonetheless, we still may argue that the analytical objective is not merely to formalize such interdependence, but
rather to explain whether it arises at all. Insofar as Sunstein's examples are designed to show that individuals maximize their utility
subject to a constraint that certain harmful actions simply cannot be
undertaken, the consequences of such a constraint may be to generate an incentive for willful self-delusion as to the consequences of
one's actions, rather than a good-faith effort to determine whether
harm will result. 7 Compartmentalizing utility-with family in one
category, work in another, and the environment in yet another-may
not generate the results one might have expected originally.
What the examples tell us is not that there ate incommensurable
goods, but that (in the examples of the neighbor, the mountain, and
romance) at least some of us prefer not to exchange some things for
money, or at least not too explicitly. This is especially likely when
what is to be exchanged (one's time together, in the case of the transferred spouse) is a relationship that conventionally is not exchanged
for money on markets. Scholars who write about incommensurability
frequently state that incommensurability is about the absence of a
common metric, and that the particular metric really does not matter."' However, the fact that their concrete examples almost always
posit an exchange of something for money, an exchange that is socially or legally sanctioned, is no accident. What these examples
demonstrate is that the claim that people cannot rank all alternatives

Economists have begun only recently to uncover the positive implications of
moral constraint. Matthew Rabin explores two alternative models of how an economic
agent factors harm to others into her decisionmaking: direct preferences for avoiding
harm (moral preferences), and self-interested utility maximization subject to the
constraint that the probability of causing harm is not too high (moral rules). See
17

MATTHEW RABIN,

MORAL CONSTRAINTS,

MORAL PREFERENCES,

AND SELF-SERVING

BIASES 6-9 (University of Cal., Berkeley, Dep't of Econ. Working Paper No. 95-241,

1995). Rabin concludes that for given beliefs regarding the likelihood that harm will
result from an action, the two approaches are identical, in that one always can construct a constrained, selfish utility function that generates precisely the same equilibrium choices as a moralistic utility function. See id. However, when people can
manipulate their beliefs, an agent who abides by moral constraints will choose an
informational signal that maximizes the probability of indicating that there is no
moral conflict (no harm caused) and allows her to pursue her self-interest, rather than
a disinterested strategy of acquiring all available low-cost information. Seeid. at 9-18.
is See, e.g., Matthew Adler, Incommensurabilityand Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1371 (1998).
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along a single metric often blurs into the claim that people either do
not or should not behave as if everything is for sale for money.
If I am correct in this interpretation, then the positive or descriptive issue raised by the incommensurability debate is not whether
individual choices can or cannot be explained as the product of
constrained maximization of a real-valued utility function over the
space of potential actions; rather, the issue is how explicit market
exchange affects the value of certain sorts of relationships. In this
Article, I take a functional, economic approach to exploring this
issue. Under this approach,'9 the task is to explain how pricing certain relationships, or aspects thereof, in markets (money or market
pricing) might affect both the individual and social value of such
relationships. Such an approach, I hope to show, is likely to prove
fruitful, not only in understanding the various behavioral phenomena
that have been taken to illustrate incommensurability or commensurability, but also in understanding some of the fundamental issues in
environmental regulation.

II. A THEORY OF RESTRICTED EXCHANGE AND SOCIAL COOPERATION
It is a commonplace observation that goods and services vary considerably in their characteristics. Whether an ingot is gold or silver
may be determined quite quickly and inexpensively. Whether a
person will make a suitable spouse may be much more difficult to
determine, in large part because the suitor herself has only a very
hazy idea of what she is looking for in such a person and understands
that her own desires and objectives will be affected by the course of
the relationship she initiates. As a general matter, markets do not
perform very well when the goods or services placed on the market
have unobservable characteristics or attributes that are an important
element of value. This is true, for example, of the famous "lemons
market" model. 0 In such markets, the presence of unobservable, lowquality goods may cause buyers to discount the price they are willing
to pay, which in turn drives out the highest-quality (highest-cost)
providers, leading to an even greater discount, until the market unbundles (that is, where equilibrium fails to exist).

'9 See generallyJasonScottJohnston, Law, Economics, and Post-RealistExplanation, 24
L. & Soc'YREv. 1217 (1990).
20 See George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 492-99 (1970) (applying the lemons-market model to a
variety of cases, including insurance and credit markets in third-world countries).
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That we in fact observe thick markets for goods of unobservable
and variable quality, such as automobiles, is due to a variety of institutional refinements, such as the product-quality warranty, which allow
high-quality providers to distinguish themselves from lower-quality
providers.2 ' One might be tempted to analogize human relationships
to such goods or services (christened "experience goods" by economists).2 The value of a friend or a spouse is likely to depend upon
that person's trustworthiness, honesty, and fidelity, qualities that may
be signaled by actions, such as refusing to accept payments for good
deeds and other benefits, that may seem disproportionately costly to
confer. 23 In this light, although beneficial actions may be reciprocated, they can function as costly signals of valuable personal traits
only if they are not exchanged for other items of value. Rather, these
actions will be thought of as essential to the creation of particular
relationships, and the question of whether one would accept money
to perform them will, to quote Epstein, be "impossible",4_to accept
money for performing them would be to defeat their social purpose.
Such an account of what may be called "character signals" may
explain why certain services or goods are provided with no expectation of compensation and, in fact, precisely because they will not be
compensated. It does not, of course, imply that the beneficiaries of
various services will be unable to rank them ordinally. I may be
pleased by my neighbor's willingness to pick up my newspaper when I
am away, but measurably happier if he also moves my trash cans for
me. Even more significantly, the fact that some actions serve to signal
one's character does not seem to explain why some exchanges not
only do not occur, but also actually are punished severely when they
do occur. There are straightforward and well-known economic explanations for many such prohibitions. To exchange babies for dollars in unregulated markets, as Chief Judge Richard Posner has
argued, would be unacceptable due to the potential for external
harm to such children.2 Surrogacy and prostitution may benefit
individual women, but may well disadvantage women as a class by

21

On warranties as signals of quality, see Michael Spence, ConsumerMisperceptions,

ProductFailureandProducerLiability,44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).
22 SeeJEANTIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 106 (1988).
2 See Colin Camerer, Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols, 94 AM. J. Soc.
S180, S182-90 (Supp. 1988) (modeling costly gifts as economic signals the value of
which often derives from their inefficiency).
2' Epstein, supra note 8, at 697.
2 See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 165-70 (5th ed. 1998).
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reinforcing social equilibria in which women hold low-paying jobs.26
Such explanations of what is wrong with unregulated exchange do
not (as the baby-selling example indicates) imply the normative
undesirability of exchange per se. It is this failure that the incommensurability thesis addresses. As I have argued above, however, it
does so in a circular and unconvincing way, by taking examples of our
moral condemnation of certain sorts of contemplated exchanges as
relevant to descriptive claims about the failure to have individual-level
cardinal or ordinal rankings.21
An alternative approach, which I hope merely to outline here, is
to develop a positive theory of restricted exchange, a theory that
accounts for the effects of prohibiting money exchange. That is, we
shall assume at first that money exchanges for certain relationships or
aspects thereof are not allowed. By tracing the effects of such a prohibition, we then may be able to explain how such prohibitions have
arisen.
Toward this end, note first that even though many human relationships do not involve the exchange of money, the common currency, they still depend strongly upon exchange.
Prohibitions on
money exchange are not tantamount to prohibitions on exchange
per se. Marriage and friendship cannot work unless both parties feel
that they are giving something to each other and getting something
in return. Close personal relationships cannot work unless they are
reciprocal. In such relationships, each person makes an emotional
and informational investment, gradually coming to care directly
about the well-being of the other, and gradually revealing private
information about herself. Any "consistent imbalance" in these in-

26 On surrogacy, compare Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor, 21
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 110 (1992) (arguing that "reproductive labor" markets reinforce gender and racial hierarchies), with Alan Wertheimer, Two Questions About
Surrogacy and Exploitation, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 211, 212 (1992) (arguing that
.surrogacy contracts should be permitted" because "surrogacy is a form of voluntary
and mutually advantageous exploitation"). On prostitution, see Jody Freeman, The
FeministDebate over ProstitutionReform: Prostitutes'RightsGroups,Radical Feminists, and the
(Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 75, 107-08 (1990) (arguing that,
under today's social conditions, criminalization of prostitution "only makes life more
difficult for prostitutes" by depriving them of their livelihood).
27 See supra Part
I.
2'That these exchanges are "socially embedded" is beyond dispute. Thus, the
economic approach can make a partial, but not complete, contribution to their
explanation. See, e.g.,JOHN DAvis, EXCHANGE 9-27 (1992) (examining different kinds
of exchanges).
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Actions are signals of such

investments. A friend who is always too busy to help and a spouse
who is too distracted to listen are failing to live up to their end of an
implicit bargain. On the other hand, a friend who demands immediate reciprocation and a spouse who expects her wishes to be satisfied
on demand are equally guilty of failing to understand the terms of
their respective relationships. For although friendship, marriage, and
similar close personal relationships involve exchange, the exchange
takes place in a "time-lagged series of reciprocated transactions," so
that when a good turn is done, repayment and reciprocity indeed are
expected, but only with delay."' Since money is not used to execute
such exchanges, these relationships involve delayed, barteredexchange.
Relative to immediate money payment, delayed, in-kind reciprocity is risky. If one agrees to perform a service only if money is paid
(either now or later), then one knows what one is getting. Money is
money precisely because the cost of ascertaining what money will do
is low.3' Under a barter system, by contrast, each side to a transaction
must determine both the physical and market characteristics of the
good or service. That is, to exchange bananas for oranges, the orange holder must be able to evaluate both the physical characteristics
of the bananas she is offered, as well as what they will be worth to
others in the market, in order to determine how many bananas per
orange to accept.3 2 In a world with relatively few goods, such evaluations may be simple enough. But as the complexity of the economy
and the number of goods and services multiply, it will become more
and more difficult for traders to execute in-kind transactions. Without money, even the development of a market for middlemen who
develop reputations for certifying the quality of various goods and
services will be stunted. Without money, the middlemen would have
to become expert in all the goods and services they might receive in
payment for certifying the quality of others.n Without money, asymmetric information about the physical and market qualities of goods

2

GRAHAM ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP 22 (1989).

3'

This point is central to the theory developed in Armen Alchian, Why Money?, 9J.

MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 133 (1977).

This model, and the terminological distinction between physical and market
attributes, is developed in Abhit V. Banerjee & Eric S. Maskin, A Walrasian Theory of
Money and Barter,111 QJ. ECON. 955 (1996).
32

" See generally Alchian, supra note 31 (explaining the use of money in exchanges
and its effects on the development of a class of specialist middlemen).
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will act as a tax on transactions, thus preventing many valueenhancing deals.
This economic explanation of why money dominates as a medium
of exchange generates insight into the effects of prohibiting money
exchange in close, personal relationships. Even if (as with contemporary dating and matchmaking businesses) one can pay money to get
information about a potential spouse or companion, the restriction
on money exchange within the relationship puts a premium on acquiring information about the potential mate. Since the relationship
involves bartered exchange (or reciprocity, in more anthropological
terms), each party has a strong incentive to learn about the human
resources and capabilities of the other-what the other has to givebefore committing to the relationship. Since the bartered exchange
typically will be delayed (that is, delayed reciprocity), each party has a
strong incentive to learn whether the other person is trustworthy and
will in fact commit to the relationship and provide what she has to
give on fair terms. Both the value of human resources and the nature
of the reciprocal commitment made by the parties inevitably will be
highly idiosyncratic. Still, the requirement that friends retain a "longrun equivalence"3 4 in their transactions may tend to favor friendships
between persons from similar social circumstances.
Differently,
strongly gendered social roles may generate a pattern of exchange
within the marriage relationship that is, at least in material terms,
highly unequal. 35
Therefore, the restriction on money exchange necessarily creates
vulnerability and increases risk.& In forming relationships within
which exchange is delayed and in-kind, what one seeks is a good
match between one's own needs and the resources of the other, and a
partner who is trustworthy. In other words, prohibiting money exchange not only increases the costs of forming the exchangerestricted relationship, but also puts a premium on trust within it.
Because exchange-restricted relationships are (relatively) costly to
form, they are costly to end-since the cost of terminating a relation-

34 ALLAN, supra
note 29, at 22.
"' This is portrayed vividly by Zelizer, who recounts the ways in which the prohibition on money exchange within the household reduced wives' independent economic
status when husbands became the sole source of household income in middle- and
upper-class Victorian American households. SeeZELIZER, supra note 16, at 70-120.
An important, implicit assumption is that promises to reciprocate in-kind within
close, personal relationships are legally unenforceable. Fuller treatment of this assumption is a topic that must be left to a later day.
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ship is determined by the difficulty of substituting it with a new relationship. Parties to such relationships might well find the prohibition
on money exchange to be a burden, an obstacle to transacting. Indeed, they might be tempted, as in the case of prostitution, to go
outside the relationship and make money purchases of services conventionally provided within it. However, by so doing, they reduce the
set of services exchanged within the relationship, thus reducing dependency upon it. "Dependency" may have a bad ring to contemporary American ears. But what it means, analytically, is that one's own
actions are reciprocated in-kind by the other party to the relationship.
To the extent that such reciprocity no longer is valued, because the
reciprocal service is provided by some other, outside money exchange, commitment is lessened. As commitment falls, so too does
the possibility of ensuring reciprocity within the relationship. One
may threaten to or actually fail to reciprocate. Friends who renege on
their engagements are at risk of seeing their own expectations disappointed. However, if those who renege are already buying whatever
they need, then they have no need for the services so imperfectly
exchanged within the relationship, and no longer are vulnerable to
threats to diminish its depth.
This might seem to imply that restricting money exchange is simply inefficient. As the examples drawn from the incommensurability
literature indicate, however, it is a common observation that although
some people seek the services of prostitutes and attempt to buy
friendships with money, many do not. Apparently, for many people,
the value of being able to trust their intimates to reciprocate exceeds
whatever temporary cost such imperfect and delayed exchange entails. Many people eschew money exchanges that would ineluctably
destroy the trust they have built up in close relationships. Social and
legal prohibitions of money exchange may simply reflect existing,
efficient social practice.
That they do more than this-by punishing inefficient exchanges-may be understood by considering the effect on the victim
of the betrayal of trust. For a person to develop the capacity to trust
another, there must be both a time lapse between the exchange of
goods or services, and reasonably clear expectations regarding what
7 Marriage, friendship, and
constitutes adequate or fair exchange.
family create expectations that care and concern will be reciprocated.
3*See BARBARAA.MISZTAL,

TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES 17 (1996) (describing the

types of exchanges in which trust plays an important role).
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Through such relationships, a person learns what reciprocity means.
This is a complex process of negotiating and constructing the terms
of the relationship. If the other party does not feel that an act has
been reciprocated adequately with sufficiently little delay, then the
value to her of the relationship will begin to diminish. The convention of reciprocity is complex and must be learned. The convention
of reciprocity, however, is, in more technical terms, the convention of
cooperation. Exchange-restricted personal relationships are where one
learns how to cooperate and to detect cooperation in others. It is in
these relationships that the expectation of reciprocity, and the rationality of trust and cooperation, is greatest. For this reason, anything
that lessens or diminishes the incentive to reciprocate within such a
relationship will have an especially damaging effect. At the risk of
sounding cliche, if one cannot trust one's parents, one's spouse, or
one's friend, then whom can one trust? And if the signals of cooperative intent sent by these intimates are proven to be false, why should
any signal of trustworthiness ever be taken seriously?
On this view, money-exchange restrictions lower the value of
cheating in cooperative relationships by restricting the set of outside
opportunities. It is not every relationship in which such restrictions
are imposed, for the point of most relationships is not to develop
trust, but rather to exchange goods or services. Yet the qualities of
trust and reciprocal cooperation that are learned in our most personal relationships are of enormous social value in lowering the cost
of market and money transactions.8 By forcing vulnerability and
commitment in some relationships, restrictions on money exchange
actually lower the social cost of forming and performing relationships
that do involve money exchange. These restrictions are imposed and
supported by social and/or legal sanctions, because they increase the
cost of violating trust, and thereby support its development.
III. RESTRICTED EXCHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

In this Part, I argue that the effects of restricted exchange in allocating access to and relationship with collective environmental goods
are similar to the effects of restricted exchange in allocating human
relationships. By eschewing money prices, we increase the collective

-"See MICHtLE

LAMONT,

MONEY,

MORALS,

AND

MANNERS

34

(1992)

("[TIrust... acts as an important regulating mechanism in work situations where
uncertainty is high. Trust is... what makes it possible for people to work together in a
productive way without being constantly on their guard .... ").
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vulnerability to the misuse of collective resources, and trust those who
are given access to collective resources to reciprocate by returning
collective benefits generated by that access. Trust, of course, may be
violated. Just as with human relationships, however, allowing money
to be paid in exchange for access to or relationship with collective
resources actually will increase the incentive to violate trust. Additional problems with pricing arise from the fact that goods are held
collectively. In particular, pricing is likely to exacerbate the difficulty
of ensuring that the agent of the collective is faithful to her mandate
in allocating access to the collectively held good. For all of these
reasons, rather than pricing access to collective goods, we sanction
their misuse (or overuse). After sketching this account, I briefly apply
it to selected contemporary issues in American environmental law.
A. Trust, Money, and the Value of Collective EnvironmentalGoods
In the United States, legal ownership of the external environment
has followed a relatively simple and basic pattern. Air and water, as
well as the land and the plants and animals on it, all were subject
initially to collective ownership. Private ownership of land-acquired
by possession and use, by sovereign grant, or by money exchangeconfers derivative private rights in the quality of the air above, the
water on and below the land, and the animals that may pass through
it. Collective ownership of an entire bundle of external resourcesland, air, and water-is the exception. Residual collective ownership
9
of nonland resources, however, is the rule.
This pattern of legal ownership of the external environment has
set up a system of exchange relations. As a default rule, money exchange is the rule for land, and for land-derivative interests in collective resources. The residual collective interest in air, water, plants,
and animals found on private lands, by contrast, generally has not
been allocated via explicit money prices. Private access to or use of
slices of pure collective ownership-as in the federal lands of the
American West-likewise has not been allocated via money prices.
Rights have been granted instead on a first-to-use basis, with fees
deliberately set so low as to be unimportant to allocative decisions.
This pattern of ownership and exchange will strike even the most
economically naive person as an inefficient giveaway. If collective
"' SeeJESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 11 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that
"[l]andownership ... commonly determines the ownership and control of a host of

other natural resources").
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interests in the external environment are not priced, then private
users will not take adequate account of the potentially harmful effects
of their use on those collective goods. This is true even of residual
collective ownership of nonland resources, for even if nearby landowners have protected legal interests in air and water quality, interests
that allow them to charge a price for degradation caused by some
other landowner, their interests may not be the same as the
"collective" interest. There inevitably will be, on this straightforward
economic account, a nonpriced externality.
It is not, however, economic theory that makes this externality
seem so obvious; rather, it is our contemporary use of private lands
and collective resources.
Industrialization, suburbanization, and
strip-mall development make it difficult to conceive of any relationship between a private landowner and collective environmental goods
other than one of rational degradation of the value of nonpriced
collective goods. Yet, such was not always so, and is not so everywhere
today. For many early white American settlers, their survival depended entirely upon resources that they did not own.4 When the
whites first came to North America, they found indigenous peoples
with an astoundingly detailed knowledge of their natural world, a
world already changed greatly by the activities of those peoples. 41 To
the Native Americans, the notion that relationship to the external
environment ought not, and indeed could not, be exchanged for
money was a bedrock belief.4 By contrast, many Europeans came to
America to find, develop, and exchange relationships with the land.4
The frontier, in fact, may be defined as the place where exchange has
not yet (but soon will) come to dominate.44

'0 For a romanticized, and yet enthralling, novelistic account of such a relationship
in frontier Florida, see PATRICK D. SMITH, A LAND REMEMBERED (1984).
41 See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND 54-55 (1983) (detailing the
Native Americans' seasonal migration to find food); STEPHENJ. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA
71-81 (1982) (discussing the Native Americans' detailed understanding of fire and its
agricultural value).
41 See CRONON, supra note 41, at 162-63 (arguing that Native
Americans were
confused by Europeans' regard for land as an economic good).
's See DONALD WORSTER, THE WEALTH OF NATURE 95-111 (1993) (describing the
effect of the European business mogul in America).
14 The prominence of the frontier as a
historical theme, especially in thinking
about the American West, may be attributed in large part to Frederick Turner. See
generally FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920)

(discussing American pioneers' ideals). For an introduction to how historical thinking
has evolved since Turner, see DONALD WORSTER, Beyond the AgrarianMyth, in UNDER
WESTERN SKIES 3 (1992).
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On the frontier, vulnerability to the natural environment was at
its greatest. Early agricultural and range use of the land did not
lessen dependence upon collectively held resources, but rather increased it. The very idea of "settling" implied a long-term relationship with collectively held resources. Selling the land for money was
not an easy thing for frontier settlers to do, for the land represented a
life, a repository of memory and tradition to be passed down through
rather than a commodity tradable through the marthe 4generations,
5
ket.
On this view (which I cannot hope to defend fully here), unrestricted money exchange in land arose as a way to facilitate long-term
relationships of trust and mutual dependence between landowners
and the collectively held, nonpriced environmental goods that played
such a large role in fixing the value of their lands. It was precisely to
create a sense that these collective goods were entrusted to private
landowners that they were included in the landowners' (commonlaw) package of legal rights. In theory, exchanging land for money
might well enhance a landowner's incentive to care for the air, water,
and other collective goods, for by enhancing the value of those goods,
the landowner also would increase the market value of her land.
This may be true in theory, but in practice, matters are much
more complex. Just as money exchange inevitably weakens the incentive to wait for delayed, reciprocal in-kind benefits in personal relationships, so too does money exchange for interests in land weaken
the incentive to make idiosyncratic, long-term investments in a place.
With money exchange, there is no need to become expert in evaluating the qualities of a place so as to determine its value relative to
another. One may accept instead the much less risky, easy-to-evaluate
common currency. With free exchange for the common currency,
the possibilities of exchange magnify, and as they do, dependence on
the land in its environment diminishes.
This is not to suggest that interests in land ought not to be freely
exchangeable for money. After all, although we may deem some
services and personal relationships to be beyond the realm of money
exchange, most services can be purchased for cash. However, just as
with relationships among people, there must be some relationships
with the natural environment that are removed entirely from the
money-exchange mechanism. These relationships with the external,

4

On the relationship between tradition, memory, and the land, see SIMON

SCHAMA, LANDSCAPE AND MEMORY (1995).
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nonhuman world are not freely exchangeable precisely to force us
into relationships of mutual dependence with the environment.
When all aspects of a slice of the external world-including land-are
held collectively and not exchangeable for money, individual returns
must take the form of a stream of in-kind benefits. By forbidding
money to be exchanged for any aspect of the collectively held external world (including, importantly, any product of individual interaction with it), we force the same sort of costly search, matching, and
barter process that occurs with human friendship and marriage. We
obligate individuals to find those collective resources that best suit
their own preferences, resources, and capabilities. They must seek
those resources that are best able to reciprocate the individuals' own
cares and concerns, not in terms of money, but in experience. As in
our most treasured human relationships, our relationships with collective environmental goods are where we learn about the complexity
of the external environment, and about how to negotiate a cooperative relationship with that environment.
Furthermore, just as we learn about trust from our closest personal relationships-a lesson of enormous value in market exchanges-the learning that takes place when we interact with
collective environmental goods may carry over to influence how we
use and exchange land. By learning to value collectively held environmental goods, we begin to appreciate the residual collective interests that attach to private land ownership. However, for this valuable
spillover to take place, interaction with collective environmental
goods must be dense and repeated. Without an adequate opportunity to relate to collective environmental goods, the social benefits of
such interaction will be diminished. As the next subpart explains in
greater detail, it is theoretically impossible to use money prices to
allocate the opportunity to interact with collective environmental
goods in a way that maximizes these social benefits.
B. The Economics of Collective, UnpricedEnvironmental Goods
Under the conventional economic approach, environmental
problems arise when an aspect of the environment, such as the atmosphere or the oceans, is under common ownership and hence
subject to what is known as the "tragedy of the commons."46 The
tragedy of the commons occurs when access to a resource is free to

46

Hardin, supra note 1,at 1244.
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all, but increased use of the resource by one person (whether positive,
as for grazing sheep, or negative, as for dumping waste) imposes costs
on other users. Under such conditions, the resource is overused.
Yet, over seventy years ago, Frank Knight pointed out that the commons problem has nothing to do with common ownership, but is
instead a simple consequence of the failure to charge an appropriate
access fee for the use of the resource. 8 In other words, the commons
problem arises because the relationship between a resource user and
the resource is not given an appropriate money price.
That a resource is owned by a group or collectivity thus has no direct relationship to the commons problem. Indeed, although the
failure to exclude individual users and to create individual rights in a
resource itself may have an economic explanation, there are plenty
of examples of relatively small collectivities that manage to allocate
their collective resources via price and nonprice mechanisms in
surprisingly efficient ways.5 The commons problem is institutional in
that it arises only because collective institutions are not designed to
facilitate efficient collective action. The difficulties to be overcome in
designing such institutions are well known. Some of the owners may
have little concern for the resource, so little, in fact, that they are
unwilling to see that it is cared for (which in the conventional account is the reason for common ownership in the first place). Conversely, other members of the "common" may care so much about the

For a path-breaking technical approach to this problem, see Martin L.
Weitzman, Free Access vs Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common
Property, 8J. ECON. THEORY 225 (1974).
"' See Frank H. Knight, Some Fallaciesin the Interpretationof Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON.
7

582, 586 (1924), reprinted in FRANK HYNEMAN KNIGHT, THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION

AND OTHER ESSAYS 217, 220 (1935). Technically, the problem arises due to the
diminishing marginal product of the variable factor. Under free entry, the average
product of the variable factor is equalized across fixed sites, which necessarily implies

supra-optimal use of the more valuable sites.
'9 Economic explanations point to the cost of administering private-ownership
regimes. See, e.g., EUINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 13 (1990) (discussing
the problems involved in privatization); Paul Seabright, Managing Local Commons:
TheoreticalIssues in Incentive Design,J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1993, at 113, 117 (suggesting

that the value of formal mechanisms of collective-resource management like privatization depends on the effectiveness of informal mechanisms).
0 See OSTROM, supra note 49, at 58-102 (presenting various case studies of com-

munal-resource allocations).
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resource that they wish it all to themselves, refusing to grant access or
regulating uses to allow only those uses that they themselves prefer. 5 '
It is, however, incorrect to label as "problems" the obstacles to efficient collective action. If we are to make a proper analytical start, it
must be by asking why a collective, exchange-restricted relationship
with some aspect of the external environment is adopted over other
alternatives. Collective ownership and restrictions on how the collective allocates relationships to collective holdings are related and yet
distinct. In this Article, I take collective ownership as a given and
explore the reasons why sanctions, rather than prices, emerge as the
means of regulating such a collective good.
It is an important, but often neglected, result in environmental
economics that even if the agent of the collective is able to charge a
money price that accurately reflects the costs imposed on others by
any one person's access to the resource, so that the access price will
encourage economically efficient resource use, all those who have
been using the resource without paying such a price will have a lower
money return under such a pricing scheme than they have been
52
This fails to
enjoying under inefficient (and unpriced) overuse.
hold only if the proceeds from the access fee are redistributed to the
current (or previous) users. Thus, as the size of the collectivity and
the cost of administering the collective-pricing mechanism increase,
so that it is no longer possible to return the access fees lump-sum to
the previous users, previous users inevitably are made worse off by the
imposition of the pricing regime. In this way, the decision not to use
prices in allocating the collective resource is effectively a collective
decision to favor existing users or potential future users.
This may (and often does) generate the suggestion that the goal
of encouraging trust and a long-term relationship with collective
environmental goods is a fiction employed by those who currently are
using the resource without paying a money access fee to oppose an
efficient fee that they fear (correctly) will reduce their money return.5' Restricting money exchange for access to or relationship with
5' SeeJames E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.

POL'y 325, 337 (1992) (arguing that one cannot advocate collective coordination as a
solution to the commons problem, since it is the cause of the problem).
52 See Weitzman, supra note 47, at 225; David de Meza & J.R. Gould, Free
Access vs
Pfivate Ownership: A Comparison, 36 J. ECON. THEORY 387 (1985) (extending and
qualifying Weitzman's results).

5"Oddly, even though proposals to establish catch quotas or entry restrictions and
fees often grandfather and do not cover existing fishermen, fishermen tend to oppose
such proposals, and to support controls-such as season closures and fishing-vessel
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collective resources, it may be argued, is simply a way of ensuring that
an inefficient distribution is not upset in place of a more efficient
redistribution of relationship. Pricing a resource, it may be argued, is
the only way to ensure that it is valued properly and not overused.
This, however, ignores the crucial role of information in collective-pricing decisions. Collective provision raises two fundamental
incentive problems: (1) ensuring that individuals truthfully reveal
how they value the resource, and (2) ensuring that the agent of the
collective allocates relationships to the resource in a way that reflects
the collective valuation of alternative relationships with it. Both of
these problems are complicated by the fact that although the external
environment survives the duration of any one person's relationship
with it, it may be altered profoundly by that relationship. The question is how prices versus nonprice sanctions as allocative mechanisms
compare along these dimensions.
1. Prices, Qualitative-Information Revelation,
and the Principle of Localism
If, as I have argued above, the decision to provide an environmental good as a collective good is triggered not by the cost or infeasibility of creating exclusive, individual property rights, but rather by
the perceived social benefits from long-term, cooperative relationships with the environment, then the economic problem for a faithful
agent of the collective will be to determine when the benefits from
such collective ownership outweigh the costs. Moreover, the agent
must decide how to allocate access to or relationship with the collectively held resources. Prices are attractive because they promise to
solve both problems. If the agent could determine how much people
benefited from alternative collective goods, and then (assuming at
least limited exclusion is possible) allocate access to or relationship
Nith those goods based on the stated willingness to pay, both problems would be solved. Any such mechanism for discerning individual
valuation must, however, describe the qualities of the resource that is
under consideration-that is, people cannot be expected to come up
with meaningful responses when asked how much they will pay for
access to a good unless the qualities of the good are described. The
agent's objective, of course, would be to elicit truthful statements of
restrictions-that seem to redistribute inefficiently the total catch. See Jonathan M.
Karpoff, Suboptimal Controls in Common Resource Management: The Case of the Fishery, 95J.
POL. ECON. 179, 180 (1987).
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individual valuation. One of the important results of contemporary
information economics is that for the agent to induce truthful revelation, she would need to offer a price-attribute menu that degraded
quality at the lower end of the menu.5 With money prices, if a person's revelation that she values an attribute highly means that she
would have to pay a great deal for it, she will have an incentive, however well-meaning, to understate her valuation of the attribute and
pay a lower price, thereby retaining economic rents generated by her
private information regarding her own values. To offset this incentive, it is necessary that the provider offer unduly low-quality opportunities to those who state a low valuation of quality. Under a moneyprice regime, the agent cannot both discern individual values and
allocate qualities efficiently given those values.
Now it is true that this revelation problem arises only because the
agent is attempting to map prices onto resource quality according to
the revealed valuation of quality. On the other hand, under a regime
of money prices, weakening the relationship between the price-quality
provided and stated value inevitably weakens the incentive to reveal
value truthfully, lowering the level of quality provided. This implies
that to allocate access to and relationship with a collective resource
faithfully, in accordance with the members' express valuation of
alternative qualitative opportunities, it may be necessary to sever any
direct connection between their stated valuation and the costs they
must actually incur to realize those values. However, if one asks how
much a person would pay to realize such an opportunity, but the
person knows full well that she in fact never will have to make such a
payment, there is no reason not to overstate value. On the other
hand, to ask a person what qualities she cares about, and then to
charge a high money price for those she cares about most, is to create
an incentive to understate value.5
Consider now the alternative of asking a person what she cares
about, but then allocating her access to environmental relationships
according not to her stated concern, but rather to the cost to others of
her realization of that relationship. 56 Were there only one sort of

5' For technical demonstration of this result, see Eric Maskin &John Riley, Monopoly with Incomplete Information, 15 RANDJ. ECON. 171 (1984).
5 This point is made nicely in RICHARD T. CARSON ET AL, THE THEORY AND

MEASUREMENT OF PASSIVE USE VALUE (University of Cal., San Diego, Dep't of Econ.
Discussion Paper No. 95-01, 1995).
56As this allocation method was independently discovered and presented in
Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 PUB. CHOICE 17 (1971), and
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relationship to the environment, and everyone were interested in
having such a relationship, such a scheme might induce successfully
the revelation of values. But there are many different sorts of relationships to the environment, just as there are many different sorts of
relationships among people. Even if our collective agent were able to
compile a list of all such potentially valuable relationships, not everyone would wish to participate in all of them. Indeed, some people
inevitably would find some relationships so distasteful that they not
only would refuse to be part of such interactions, but would view
them as being harmful to other relationships. Toward these they
would express extreme negative valuation; and yet since they themselves would never engage in such an interaction, they would bear a
cost only if we expanded our scheme to require a price to be paid for
excluding someohe else's relationship to the environment as well as
for maintaining one's own. But even if we agree that exclusion is to
be determined simply by adding up individually expressed dollar
valuations of benefit or harm, making payments to those whose desired relationships are excluded under such a calculus would create
an incentive to devise and threaten new and ever more harmful relationships merely to garner payments (which might truly be called
greenmail) for not having them. The only way to avoid this problem
would be to make a prior determination that excludes certain qualities or attributes of environmental relationships as being of potential
individual value. Such a determination then cannot be based on
stated or express individual values.
This analytical exercise has an important set of policy consequences. As the relationships between members of the collective and
the resources the collective holds become more fragmented and
heterogeneous, it becomes increasingly difficult and eventually impossible to devise any kind of price-based mechanism that will elicit
truthfully how individuals are affected by one another's relationships.
When all members of the collective engage in the same activities, they
all perceive the activities as beneficial and worthy of regulating appropriately; but when some members perceive the activities as generating no benefits to them, they have an incentive simply to ban them.
Even worse, perhaps, the more distinctive and nonoverlapping are
individual relationships to the environment, the greater the incentive

Theodore Groves, Incentives in Teams, 41 ECONOMETRICA 617 (1973), such a mecha-

nism is often referred to as a "Clarke-Groves" mechanism.
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under a collective-pricing mechanism actually to produce new, generally harmful relationships.
Another way of putting this general result is that the viability of collective pricing depends upon the viability of community. Inasmuch as
smaller collectives are likely to share many of the same relationships
to a collective resource, this may be termed the principle of localism in
collective pricing. Only a collective in which individuals have similar
relationships to and feelings toward their collectively held resources
can possibly succeed in eliciting individual valuations. Under such
circumstances, a collective-pricing mechanism can be very useful to a
faithful agent of the collective in determining which relational features-intensity of use or precautions to avoid unnecessary harm to
inherited (or natural) attributes-will best serve the collective interest.

There is a further policy corollary: Collective pricing cannot be
used to determine which uses or relationships should be permitted

among a class of widely differing and conflicting uses. The greater
the variation in potential uses or relationships, the greater the incentive to misstate individual valuations under even the best collective
price-based revelation mechanism.
2. Science, Incentives, and the Limits of Localism
Just as the complexity of individual interaction with the collectively held good dooms collective-pricing mechanisms as a way of
eliciting individual value ex ante, so too does such complexity frustrate attempts to attach prices ex post via a liability regime. s The
observable qualities of a particular collective resource may be altered

between the time a particular person begins and ends her relationship with that resource. Determining, however, whether that person's
relationship has effected those changes will be more difficult, for the

more complex her relationship is to the resource, the greater the
number of other users, and the greater the variation in uses. If, for
instance, all users are loggers, and we observe and measure a decline

in forested acres, then we may be able to determine quite easily each
logger's separate contribution to the overall decline in forest acreage.
If, however, the collective has allowed logging, agriculture, and indus-

try all within close proximity to the forest, and we observe that many
trees are diseased and beset by insect infestation, then we may be
-7 See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1523 (postulating the idea that ex post
damages may
be thought of as prices).
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unsure of the precise way timber harvesting patterns have interacted
with the chemical by-products of agriculture and industry in causing
forest decline. Such uncertainty is, moreover, likely to be greater the
more complex is the ecological relationship among collective resources. Were collective resources isomorphic to ecosystems, and
ecosystems biologically distinct, then we might hope to identify, over
time, the separate impact of even very complex human uses. But
when collective resources are not isomorphic to biologic communities, the impact of human relationship with a particular collective
resource cannot be identified without taking into account human
interaction with other, biologically related resources.
Thus, even if our community members were to share many relationships to the forest (everyone benefited from logging, farming,
industry, and recreational use of the forest, making a collectiverevelation mechanism in principle possible), they could not attach a
value to alternative styles or levels of human relationship unless they
were first informed as to how alternative levels or styles affected those
attributes. This would become increasingly difficult, and eventually
impossible, as the complexity of human interaction and disparity
between collective resources and biologic communities increased.
Localism-the organization of collective-ownership units designed to
correspond as closely as possible to shared human interest in the
environment-ameliorates the problems of collective-revelation
mechanisms caused by complex and differing human interactions
with the environment. But localism tends to worsen the disparity
between human and nonhuman communities. As localism strengthens, it becomes increasingly difficult for the collective to identify how
its members' interactions with the collective resource affect its observable attributes, thus frustrating attempts to attach a dollar valuation to those interactions.
This is not, it should be stressed, an argument about scientific
knowledge, but rather one about collective incentives. The ability to
generate scientific information regarding the relationship between
individual uses and environmental impact is not necessarily affected
by the fragmentation of units of collective human ownership from
natural ecosystems. Rather, the difficulty is that as the number of
human collectives increases, so too does the incentive for each collective to produce science indicating that the adverse or unwelcome
impact on its collective resource has been caused by activities permitted by other collectives. To solve this interjurisdictional problem, we
would require a super-mechanism, designed to elicit not only how
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each collective values various attributes of its collective resources and
the effect on those resources of activities conducted elsewhere, but
also its best, truthful scientific assessment of the impact of its own
activities on the resources held by other collectives.
This model implies the economic desirability of a global definition of the community of environmental scientists: It is only with
such a universal scientific jurisdiction that we can hope to overcome
the incentive problems besetting the truthful elicitation of scientific
assessments. Yet the demand for such assessments-that is, the need
to determine what has caused discernible environmental impact-is,
of course, a function of a particular community's collective valuation
of its own environmental goods. Scientific study of the environment
is just another of many human interactions with the environment. A
global collective-choice mechanism would need to elicit the valuation
of such scientific activity, but such activity affects the allocation of
prices under the mechanism by determining causality. Hence, no
individual could assess the valuation of scientific activity without first
determining the effect that science is likely to have upon the prices
she has to pay under the mechanism. This is something that cannot
be known until the scientific activity has taken place. Even worse,
were it known or anticipated in advance, an individual's valuation of
scientific activity would depend on the effect such activity had upon
her prices under the mechanism. If she expected science to be costly
to her, she would have an incentive to undervalue science severely.
The only way to price science under such a mechanism, then, may be
to conceal how it is used or what it might find. At a fundamental,
conceptual level, science cannot be evaluated under a collective-price
mechanism.
3. Prices, Sanctions, and the Social Value of
Collective Environmental Goods
Complexity and variation in human interaction with the inherited
environment thus create insuperable problems for price-based collective-ownership systems. Such systems attempt to elicit individual
valuations of observable, measurable environmer tal attributes, but
individual incentives to reveal such values decrease with the scope of
collective ownership, even though the ability to discern the relationship between individual actions and collective attributes increases
with such scope. The problem of designing a method for a pricebased mechanism for valuing environmental change is, conceptually,
unsurmountable.
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These largely negative results regarding the viability of collectivepricing mechanisms carry both positive and normative implications
for how decisions to provide and regulate collective environmental
goods actually may be made. When all members of the collective
know at the time the initial decision regarding collective provision is
made that relationships to that good will not be negotiated via money
exchange, demand for collective provision will be strongest among
those who already possess the resources necessary to realize benefits
from the collective good. In some cases, such as air, this will entail
consensus collective provision. In other cases, such as parks and
natural areas, collective provision will be supported by those who
already are making nonmarket use of the resource. Those who wish
to realize the market value of the resource will support collective
provision if and only if the agent of the collective allocates access via a
nonprice mechanism, but then allows the free exchange of some of
the fruits of access. Such a scheme, however, is no different than
allowing the unbundling of our closest human relationships. The
reason services provided by friends and spouses are not compensated
in the common currency is that such compensation cuts the incentive
to wait for in-kind compensation, thus lessening dependence-the
very dependence that compels the negotiation of trust. In the same
way, allowing users of collective resources to sell the products of their
interaction with the collective resources-the timber they cut or the
crops they grow using collectively provided water-creates an opportunity for outside compensation in the common currency, which
lessens, if not destroys, any need to wait for in-kind compensation.
As a positive matter, this model therefore explains the intuitive
reaction of Sunstein 58 and others that the sense of awe and wonder we
perceive upon viewing our great, collectively held natural resources
indeed may be related to the fact that the right to such an experience
may not be sold for cash. Just as offering to pay money in exchange
for a friend's help signals rejection of a future obligation to reciprocate in-kind, so too does the collective agent's sale of access to collective environmental goods signal that the user is under no further
obligation to reciprocate the benefits provided by such access by
helping to care for and conserve those goods. The fact that goods are
collectively held is, on this view, crucial: When a resource is individually owned, we look to the owner to protect and enhance its value; but
the value of a collective good is determined by the extent to which

See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 780.
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individual members of the collective feel that they owe something in
return for its provision. This indebtedness is worked off by spending
time, energy, and money to express one's individual valuation, an
expression that takes place not only in individual use, but also in
public participation via voting, lobbying, and interest-group membership. The institutional problem of free-riding posed by collective
provision is precisely the reason that collectively provided environmental goods are not sold off for money: The free-rider problem is
overcome inasmuch as individuals feel an obligation to take costly
action to reciprocate past benefits and ensure the viability of future
benefits. .
For this same reason, prohibiting money from being exchanged
for access to collectively held environmental goods increases the risk
of inefficient rent-seeking behavior. In particular, the model condemns the very common American practice of providing goods collectively but then allowing private users of such collective goods to sell
products of their use. Users who are allowed to commodify the product of accessing collectively held environmental goods necessarily will
generate higher money returns from their access than will those who
are looking to the future existence of the resource for their return.
When we clarify what is to be gained from collective provision, we can
see that there are probably far too many collective environmental
goods in the United States provided simply to subsidize private market activity rather than to encourage the development of a cooperative social engagement with the external environment.
Exchange-restricted collective provision thus promises benefitsthe creation of private incentives for costly action to protect collectively provided environmental goods-but has costs as well-the
creation of an incentive for rent-seeking under the guise of such
"protective" efforts. The legal problem is to find a regulatory system
that maximizes the expected net benefits from such collective goods.
The answer, I believe, does not lie in making the individual user
liable for the harm caused by individual interaction with or use of
collective resources, for as argued above, such a scheme amounts to
an ex post money-price mechanism. Moreover, as illustrated by the
contemporary debate over Superfund, the complexity of environmental causation generates enormous transaction costs, either directly (in causation determinations) or indirectly (in attempts to shift
the liability among potentially responsible individuals). Such individual liability must remain a secondary regulatory tool. Rather than
pricing environmental harm, we must rely upon collective responsi-
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bility for environmental use. Such a scheme creates an incentive for
individual members of the collective not only to monitor use, but also
to report their observations to the collective agent. Monitoring, after
all, is costly. Monitoring is not an end in itself, but rather a means of
identifying those uses that are suitable for sanction. By making the
continuing permissibility of existing uses contingent upon the communicated collective response to alternative uses, rather than on the
payment of a certain sum of money (either ex ante or ex post), the
exchange restrictions imposed on collectively held environmental
goods manage to ensure that users will internalize certain effects of
their use on other members of the collective.
Purely as a theoretical matter, the ideal or "first-best" pattern of
internalization under collective nonprice regulation will look very
different from the internalization ideal under a money-price regime.
Precisely because individual interests in collective environmental
goods are so diverse and conflicting, regulatory fine-tuning is economically undesirable. With collective goods, incentive compatibility
is provided by a rule that says the good will not be provided unless
there is clear evidence that the potential benefits from such provision
are large and far exceed the costs. This both raises the cost and
lowers the expected return to individual efforts to lobby for new
collective goods. With the extent (rather than depth) of support
driving the decision to provide a resource as a collective unpriced
good, those individuals who demand collective provision simply as a
means of getting private goods for free will face especially low chances
of success.
The need to elicit truthfully individual perceptions of collective
value constrains not only the initial determination of collective environmental goods, but also their subsequent regulation. Because the
collective agent cannot hope to calibrate uses precisely, the best that
the agent can do is to identify and sanction those uses that are sure to
injure collective values. Apparent gross or severe departures from
collective norms regarding use of the environment are, on this view,
sanctioned not because they are known to cause injuries of comparable magnitude, but because only gross departures from collective
norms regarding use are known almost certainly to cause some degree
of injury. We condemn our neighbors for putting our parks and
shared resources to clearly impermissible uses, not because we are

-9 The theory is set out in detail in Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New
ParadigmofEfficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385 (1987).
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sure that there is great harm from such use, but because the lessons
of time and tradition teach that there surely will be some harm. The
presumptions of tradition are not irrebuttable, but they are presumptions nonetheless. Because the decision to sanction only gross violations is an instrumental decision, rather than a reflection of its certain
moral culpability, the sanction only needs to reflect instrumental or
deterrence concerns rather than a moral judgment of culpability.
As an immediate corollary, one would expect that violations in
the character or type of use made of collective resources will be
6
level or quantity of use. 0
treated very differently from violations in the
Judgments of moral culpability likely would be found fully appropriate when a use forbidden entirely because of its perceived harmfulness is undertaken. If personal watercraft are forbidden on public
lakes, or dumping is prohibited in public parks, then violators of such
prohibitions certainly will be judged as having committed a wrong:
The public prohibition on any level of such uses expresses the public
judgment that such uses are invariably harmful. When, by contrast,
an industrial facility is found to have exceeded permissible effluent
standards by a relatively small amount, a resulting sanction does not
express any clear judgment that such an overage is in fact unduly
harmful. Similarly, if that same facility were found to have antipollution devices that were not well-maintained, the appropriate
sanction would be lower than if it had been found to have failed
entirely to install the devices.
As this suggests, a crucial difference between prices and sanctions
is in the latter's usefulness in facilitating reputational penalties. Small
collectives typically enforce their use restrictions through nonlegal,
collective sanctions, the paradigmatic instance of which is ostracism
or exclusion.6' Providing and regulating collective goods at the state
or national level does not mean that exclusion from particular, local
supplies of those goods becomes infeasible. Rather, the difficulty is in
gathering and transmitting to local communities verifiable information about an economic actor's past history of resource uses and
abuses. Under a pricing regime, the fact that an actor has paid taxes
or fees in the past is not informative as to the quality of her past

'0 For a wonderful, recent realization of this prediction, compare the majority and
dissenting opinions in United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994).
6' For case studies, see MAKING THE COMMONS WORK (Daniel W. Bromley ed.,
1992); THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS (Bonnie J. McCay &James M. Acheson eds.,
1987); and David Feeny et al., The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenl-Two Years Later, 18
HUM. EcoLOGY 1 (1990).
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resource use. It is, indeed, one's right under a regime of prices or
fees to lower collective values through one's own use, provided that
one pays the price. When, by contrast, sanctions have been imposed
for large departures from permitted uses or use levels in the past,
there is verifiable evidence that the actor has been guilty of at least
some kind of violation (even though the magnitude of past violations
may remain somewhat uncertain). Exclusion can be credible and
effective if and only if there is some way of labeling 6past violators.
do not. 2
Sanctions perform this labeling function; prices

A final, related point is that the choice between sanctions and
prices is likely to be especially important when resources are much in
demand, so much so that their economically optimal use may be close
to a level at which their self-renewal is in doubt. There is no difficulty
when this critical level is known with certainty, but when, as is typically true, the critical level is uncertain, a pricing regime easily may
jeopardize the survival of the resource. Under a regime of prices, a
particularly hot summer's high demand for energy to run air conditioners will result in high levels of output and (priced) emissions;
under use controls backed by sanctions, the level of emissions will be
fixed (even though under a regime of tradable quotas, the price will
rise).63 The credibility of both legal and extralegal sanctions will be
enhanced by a perception that limits on resource use are critical to
the survival of the collective good.
4. Prices, Sanctions, and the Costs of Collective Agency
The collective decision to adopt sanctions rather than prices in allocating rights to collective goods is explicable also in terms of its
effect on the incentives of the collective agent given responsibility for
the collective resource. The agency problem, simply put, is how the
members of the collective are to determine that what the agent says is
the best use of the resource really is best, rather than just that which
maximizes the selfish interest of the agent. With a commonly owned
resource, the objective is to ensure that access to the resource will be
granted if and only if the collective is better off granting the access
and receiving what is offered in exchange by the applicant than it
62 This

point has been made in a more general context by Robert Cooter. See

ROBERT D. COOTER, LAWs AND PRICES:

HOW ECONOMICS CONTRIBUTED TO LAw BY

MISUNDERSTANDING MORALITY (University of Cal., Berkeley, Program in Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 94-3, 1994).
4 See Martin L. Weitzman, Pyices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 477
(1974).
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64
would be were the application denied. As argued earlier, the economic approach suggests that the problem with making collective
decisions about resource access is in finding a representative who
cares enough about how the resource is used to expend effort to
enhance its value, and yet not so much about it that she will attempt
to appropriate all of its value for herself. The problem, in economic
terms, is one of agency costs.6s The problem with allowing such an
agent to exchange access to the resource for money is that it is difficult to determine where the money goes, and without such a determination, it is impossible to verify that the collective in fact has been
66
This is especially so
made better off by virtue of the exchange.
when, as under a pricing scheme, the level of the activity directly
increases the monetary return to the agent. Under such a scheme,
the agent has an incentive to increase the level of the activity merely
67
to increase revenues via the pricing mechanism. What is needed is a
scheme that makes the agent's return relatively invariant with respect
to violations of the permissible level of activities, but increases her
return with the number of detected violations. Such incentives are
provided by the regime of sanctions.

IV.

APPLICATIONS

The analytical framework presented here may be applied to a
wide variety of contemporary issues in environmental regulation.
Here, I have space to present merely a few incomplete illustrations of
how such applications would proceed.

" See supra text accompanying note 51.
65 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theoy of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976) ("We
define agency costs as the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2)
the bonding expenditures by the agent, (3) the residual loss .... [A]gency costs arise
in any situation involving cooperative effort... by two or more people .... ").
4 Cf id. at 309 n.10 ("[T]he existence of positive monitoring... costs will result in

the manager of a corporation possessing control over some resources which he can

allocate... to satisfy his own preferences.").
67 For a similar discussion of this problem, see Wallace E. Oates, Pollution Chargesas
a Source of Public Revenues, in ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
135, 140-45 (Herbert Giersch ed., 1993).
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A. The Contingent-Valuation Controversy

Under Superfund, the issue of how to value damages to collectively held resources has arisen.68 Courts have found a congressional
preference for restoration cost as a measure of natural-resource damages under Superfund.6 At the same time, however, they have held
that both the use and nonuse value of such resources may be compensable under that statute." There are a variety of ways to measure
the lost-use value caused by damage to natural resources. 7' Measuring
the value that people derive merely from the existence of a commonly
held resource is, however, more difficult. Even if the state charges a
fee for accessing and using commonly held resources, such a fee
bears no necessary relationship to the total collective valuation of the
resource and its continued existence. Whether we call it nonuse
value, preservation value, bequest or stewardship value, or inherent
value, there is now quite widespread agreement that there is an element of value that is not captured by the prices or fees charged to use
a commonly held resource.
How we might measure such value is, however, a topic of enormous controversy.7 Since people do not pay a market price for nonuse value, we cannot look to the market for valuation estimates. What
Under
has arisen instead is the practice of contingent valuation.

See Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (C) (1994) (indicating certain types of damages that are recoverable); Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 77273 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the valuation of damages); Ohio v. Department of the
Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding a regulation limiting the damages recoverable contrary to congressional intent and therefore invalid).
69 See Ohio v. Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 450 ("Congress intended
restoration costs to be the basic measure of recovery for harm to natural resources.").
70 See id. at 463-64; see also Thomas A. Campbell, Economic Valuation of Injury to
NaturalResources,NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 28, 30 (discussing a case in
which the court accounted for both use and nonuse values in calculating damages).
71 SeegenerallyECONOMIC VALUATION OFNATURAL RESOURCES (Rebecca L.Johnson
& Gary V. Johnson eds., 1990); A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES 141-98 (1993); MEASURING THE DEMAND FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALiTY 213-320 (John B. Braden & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 1991).
72 See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond &Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent ValuationMeasurement
of Nonuse Values, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES 61 (Richard B. Stewart ed., 1995)
(critiquing the contingent-valuation methodology).
" Although not yet upheld against explicit legal challenge, contingent valuation
has been used in a number of CERCLA natural-resource damage assessments, and
poses a number of legal issues. SeeJohn Daniel Ballbach, A Survey of NaturalResource
Damages Cases, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES, supra note 72, at 85, 109-10; Richard
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contingent valuation, people are surveyed and asked questions designed to elicit how much they would be willing to pay for environmental cleanup or restoration.7 4 Various criticisms have been made of
this practice, 75 but the only one upon which I wish to dwell here is the
charge, leveled by psychologists such as Daniel Kahneman, that contingent-valuation responses reflect not the economic value of collectively held environmental goods, but "a willingness to acquire a sense
of moral satisfaction ...by a voluntary contribution to the provision
of a public good." 76 The primary evidence for this "moral goods" view
is the alleged insensitivity of the stated "willingness to pay" to the
scope of the environmental good. More precisely, it is argued that:
(1) when subjects are asked for their willingness to pay for a list of
environmental goods, their stated willingness to pay for a particular
good varies with its position in the list; and (2) willingness to pay for
an environmental good is higher when it is considered on its own
than when considered as part of a more inclusive good (the
The argument was made originally by
"embedding" effect) .
8
Kahneman, who presented a graph illustrating that a survey of Ontario residents showed that these residents were willing to pay almost
as much to preserve fish stocks in a single lake as they were to pay to
preserve fish populations in all Ontario lakes.79 Kahneman argued
that if the amount people are willing to pay to preserve collective
environmental goods does not vary with the level of those goods, then
it must be that their stated willingness to pay does not express an
economic valuation of such goods, but rather is a statement as to how

B. Stewart et al., Evaluating the Present Natural Resource Damages Regime: The Lawyer's
Perspective in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES, supra note 72, at 153, 171-73.
74 See ROBERT C. MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE
PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 2 (1989) (stating that this
method "uses survey questions to elicit people's preferences for public goods by
finding out what they would be willing to pay for specified improvements in them").
75 For a collection of criticisms, see CONTINGENT VALUATION (Jerry A. Hausman
ed., 1993). See also Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness to
Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-7
(1994) (discussing some of the criticisms of the contingent-valuation method).
76 Daniel Kahneman &Jack L. Knetsch, ValuingPublic Goods: The Purchase of Moral
Satisfaction,22J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.57, 64 (1992).
" See id.at 58.
78 See R.G. CUMMINGS ET AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 185-94 (1986)
(comments by Professor Daniel Kahneman).
7 See id.at 191 fig.12.2.
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much they would pay for the "moral satisfaction" of contributing to
such goods. 0
Economists who conduct contingent-valuation surveys have countered the psychologists' "moral goods" approach in a variety of ways.
First, they have argued that the econometric evidence does not establish that contingent-valuation surveys indeed are subject to insensitivity to scope."' Theoretically, they have explained that precisely
because the kinds of environmental goods subject to contingent
valuation are collective, quantity-constrained goods, standard neoclassical economic theory predicts embedding and sensitivity to the order
2
in which a good is presented in a list of environmental goods.8 Forbidding money-price allocation means that many people will feel
constrained: They would exchange money for greater access to, or
more of, the resource, if they were allowed to do so. If, however, one
specifies that a larger or more inclusive relationship is already available, then a person may get the relationship she desires as a side
benefit, as it were, without paying anything. For instance, if one
specifies that a park containing many beautiful lakes has been provided, and then asks how much a lover of lakes would pay to preserve
the lakes, then it may well be that the respondent sees little need to
pay much of anything, for she believes that provision of the park
entails the (nonprice) provision of the lakes. Such an effect might
well be found even were one not to say explicitly that the lakes were
within the park, given the tendency of people to make implicit assumptions about such relationships.
The simultaneous provision of other collective resources generally will affect how a person values any particular collective resource.
Moreover, because collective environmental goods are quantityconstrained, there is no reason to expect a neatly continuous pattern
of valuation responses.8 Such goods are provided only in discrete
increments, rather than in the continuous variations necessary to

"' See Kahneman & Knetsch, supra note 76, at 64-67.
8' For a spirited presentation of this view, see RICHARD T. CARSON, CONTINGENT
VALUATION SURVEYS AND TESTS OF INSENSITIVITY TO SCOPE 18-28 (University of Cal.,

San Diego, Dep't of Econ. Discussion Paper No. 95-05, 1995).
82

See RICHARD CARSON ET AL., ON THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC

GOODS: THE MATTER OF SEQUENCING (University of Cal., San Diego, Dep't of Econ.
Discussion Paper No. 95-21, 1995).
3 The effect of rationing is to create a nondifferentiability or kink in the resource
constraint facing a user, so that a discrete increase in the level of the collective resource may produce greatly disproportionate changes in the constrained user's
relative valuation.
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smooth valuation. As a consequence, the amount a person would be
willing to pay to protect what she views as a unique resource might
not be affected by the availability of other collective resources. Other
persons may perceive many substitutes for a particular resource relationship; yet that perception does not imply that such individuals do
not value the continued existence of the resource or care about its
protection.
In my view, both the contingent-valuation economists and their
critics have failed to focus on some of the crucial issues raised by
contingent valuation. The first of these is to delimit the class of resources and actions with respect to which current practice makes
pricing a meaningful, conceptually coherent possibility. To ask people how much they would pay to enhance a collective good or to
prevent its harm is not sensible when we neither require nor allow
such payments. Collective resources are regulated not via price, but
via controlling their uses and sanctioning impermissible use. It is,
therefore, essential that one specify whether the harm or enhancement comes from allowing a new use or prohibiting an existing use,
or as a result of varying the level of a current use. My approach predicts that people will feel very differently about variations in the type
of use versus variations in the level of care: If one tells people that
the Exxon Valdez was the wrong kind of tanker, people will respond
very differently than if one tells them that it was piloted with insufficient care. Such a pattern of responses has nothing to do with
whether the good is a "moral" or an "economic" good. What is being
assessed in such an experimental survey is not a price, but a sanction.
The magnitude of sanctions is determined not by the harm caused or
averted, but by the conduct at issue. Sanctions are not prices, and
there is no reason to expect that the way people assess sanctions will
match the way the economic theory of individual behavior predicts
they will attach prices. By fashioning surveys that test this proposition, we may go a long way toward resolving the contingent-valuation
controversy, as well as toward resolving larger issues regarding the
debate between rational economic versus behavioral models of individual behavior.8 5

SeeArrow, supra note 5, at 759; Epstein, supra note 8, at 690-93.
A promising step in this direction has been taken recently in CASS R. SUNSTEIN
ET AL., ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES (WITH NOTES ON COGNITION AND VALUATION IN
LAW) (University of Chicago Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 50 (2d ser.), 1997).
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B. ProtectingEcosystems
One of the major environmental policy initiatives of the Clinton
administration has been to use Habitat Conservation Plans to fashion
an incremental, or noncatastrophic, approach to ecosystem protection." The goal of the incremental approach is to avoid costly conflicts, triggered when proposed private land-development activities
threaten to impair significantly habitats critical to the survival of
endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), such
activities are subject to an inflexible prohibition, violation of which is
subject to civil and even criminal sanction. The application of such
a prohibition inevitably entails the loss of any economic benefits may
be generated by the prohibited activity, thus putting regulators in the
extremely uncomfortable position of mediating between those who
care passionately about threatened species and those who care passionately about private property rights.
The ESA epitomizes what might be termed the catastrophic approach to regulating private relationships with collective resources:
One may inflict some harm on the resource without making any
money payment or running afoul of any collective rule regarding use,
and yet an action that threatens the very existence of the collective
resource is prohibited absolutely. Such a regulatory regime refuses to
attach a price to the resource. If money penalties are imposed, they
are imposed as a sanction for violating a collective prohibition.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) regulates both private actions that may
jeopardize the continued survival of endangered species and (somewhat more
broadly) public actions. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994). The decision whether to
list a species is viewed as having enormous consequences. See generally Oliver A.
Houck, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departmentsof Interior
and Commerce 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 277, 280-96 (1993) (discussing the listings and
exceptions). Congress responded to the catastrophic consequences of listing determination by amending the ESA in 1982 to permit the Interior Department's Fish and
Wildlife Service to fashion Habitat Conservation Plans ("HCPs") to allow the taking of
an endangered species if the taking is (a) incidental to an activity that would (aside
from the ESA) be lawful, and (b) pursuant to an HCP that minimizes the harm caused
by such a taking. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). However, as described by Barton
Thompson, few HCPs actually were adopted until 1994. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305,
315-21 (1997). Indeed, only three long-term regional HCPs were adopted between
1982 and 1994; but from 1995 to June 1996, three more regional HCPs were adopted.
See id. at 318. For an account of the tortuous path to one such plan for the Balcones
Canyonlands near Austin, Texas, see CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S
CHOIcE 176-211 (1995).
87 Inflexible, that is, in the absence of a negotiated HCP. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538,
1540.
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Catastrophic environmental regulation has been attacked as irrationally precipitating conflicts that result in political compromises
that fail to protect species adequately, the prospect of which actually
encourages a race to develop potentially critical habitats before they
become critical.8 On the other hand, incremental approaches, which
attempt to anticipate and avoid such conflicts, allow limited development and thus may be seen as an exchange of habitat integrity and
species health for economic, job-related benefits, violating the letter
and spirit of the ESA.
Empirical evaluation of this point would require a comparison of
the activities actually permitted under settlements reached in the
shadow of the ESA's absolute prohibition with those allowed under
incremental agreements. My purpose here, however, is to apply my
theory of prices versus sanctions in the regulation of collective goods
to reconceptualize the normative issues raised by catastrophic environmental regulations such as the ESA and wetlands-protection pro89
grams.
To apply this approach, we first must reconceptualize the collective resource or good that is protected under the ESA's catastrophic
approach. The conventional understanding is that this law protects
species, rather than their individual members. 90 The language and
legislative history of the ESA support this understanding, and such an
understanding is not inconsistent with congressional amendments to
the Act.91 Nonetheless, the ESA's legislative history makes it equally

See Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The Law and
Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SUP. Cr. ECON. REV. 1, 33 (1997) ("If there is any
sense that private land will be subject to controls, then the best strategy for the private
owner is to destroy the habitat before it becomes protected....").
89 Under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the Army Corps of Engineers regulates the development of wetlands under a permit program, subject to (rarely exercised) EPA veto authority. See 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (a)-(c). Even though the permit
process generally is considerably more flexible than the ESA's prohibition on taking
endangered species, it too has come under severe attack from developers and property-rights advocates. See Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and SimilarEnvironmentalLaws, 60 U. COLO. L.
REV. 773 (1989) (discussing problems with section 404).
90 Indeed, the ESA has come to be evaluated almost exclusively in scientific terms,
that is, in terms of whether its legal structure corresponds to scientific opinions on
how to preserve and protect species effectively. See, e.g., ENDANGERED SPEcIEs RECOVERY (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 1994); Ronald Carroll et al., Strengtheningthe Use of Science
in Achieving the Goals of the EndangeredSpecies Act: An Assessment by the EcologicalSociety of
America; 6 ECOLOGICALAPPLICATIONS 1 (1996).
9' An interesting account of the ESA's legislative history is provided in MANN &
PLUMMER, supra note 86, at 149 ("The [ESA] sprang less from informed policymaking
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clear that Congress was protecting the opportunity for individual
persons to come into relationship with the great, flagship species
92
found on our continent, such as the bald eagle. Indirectly, this is to
protect and value the opportunity for individual persons to come into
relationship with the wilderness those species inhabit and to ensure
that those places are not destroyed. This collective opportunity is not
allocated via money prices, and, although the ESA makes possible the
acquisition of private lands to enhance and93 magnify such collective
opportunity, such acquisition has been rare.
However difficult in practice, it would be conceptually possible to
charge a money price for actions causing harm even to individual
members or local species populations. Moreover, whether a species is
threatened may have little to do with whether the ability of individual
persons to interact with particular species populations is impaired. If,
for instance, there are Northern Spotted Owl populations in both
California and the Pacific Northwest, then the fact that healthy populations remain in California will not mean there is any less harm
suffered by those that live in the Pacific Northwest and rarely visit
California. From this perspective, what is remarkable about the ESA
is not that it prohibits actions causing the extinction of an entire
species, but that it fails to attach any money price to actions harming
populations within species.
Under my theory, this must be justified in some way by the effect
of failing to charge a money price for harm to populations of species.
Here, the accountability aspect of the theory is crucial. If we allowed
harm to individual populations to be priced, then we would create an
incentive for the agent of the collectivity to promote harm to populations, precisely when those who would be harmed were local groups
that were not able to organize and be represented. It would be extremely difficult to determine whether the local harm was offset by
collective money benefits. Insofar as local costs were large, there
would be an enhanced incentive for the agent to ensure that the
money was spent on a concentrated benefit and to alert the beneficiaries of the quid pro quo nature of the benefit they received.

than from the simple aspiration to save everything-to banish extinction from the face
of the planet, or at least from the United States.").
9

See id. at 148 (noting, inter alia, that the ESA may have been designed to protect

"bald eagles and grizzly bears").
93See Thompson, supra note 86, at 346 (noting barriers to the government pur-

chase of property, including the requirement of "completing reams of studies and
reports" before "mak[ing] a move under the ESA").
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When, by contrast, we do not allow the agent of the collectivity to
charge money prices, we essentially put those persons who value local
populations of species at risk that the populations will be destroyed by
the actions of their neighbors. Even with the restriction on money
exchange, there will be strong incentives for such persons to find a
collective way to offer some medium to exchange for restrictions on
the development and preservation of local populations. In other
words, it is the very fact that the collectivity fails to price individualpopulations at the level of the species that creates an incentive for local action to
protect such populations. By refusing to attach a money price to harm at
the population level, catastrophic regulation both refuses to condone
such harm and creates local responsibility for avoiding it. With strong
human relationships to local populations, the species-extinction
problem ought never arise, the catastrophe ought never come to pass.
That it does, and with such seeming frequency, is, in my view, a
consequence primarily of the overuse of money exchange for collective
resources. When (as has been historically true of the United States
Forest Service 94) the agent of the collective derives its revenue substantially, if not entirely, from selling access to and use of the collective resource, the agent's incentives to permit uses that are not in the
collective interest are extremely strong. More generally, it does not
matter for this purpose whether the money revenue is collected in the
form of a direct tax on the quantity of collective good used or on the
money revenue generated by the activity that puts the resource to use
(as is true of local property taxes); in either event, the agent of the
collective will have an interest in allowing uses of the collective resource that are not in the collective interest, but rather that generate
private benefits to both the agent and the resource user. On this
view, species become extinct not because governments do not charge
money prices for harm to species, but instead because they do.
C. AssessingRegulatory Alternatives
The existing economic approach to assessing alternative regulatory regimes for protecting the environment may be summarized,

For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the legal framework governing the Forest Service's management of the national forests, see Charles F. Wilkinson
& H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planningin the NationalForests, 64 OR. L.
REV. 1 (1985).
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conventional economic argument is that we have now reached the
stage at which collective environmental resources are subject to such
intense use that the administrative and transaction costs of administering a regime of explicit money prices for access to and relations
with these resources are more than justified in light of the cost (and
incentives) of alternative command and control regulatory regimes.9
Much of this argument's force is derived from the fact that the costs
of the existing command and control regime are large and obvious,
and from the quite sound intuition that collective environmental
goods will be overused if users are not somehow made to internalize
the harm to others caused by their use.
The argument developed above shows why the actual implementation of a pricing regime may be much more complex than commonly is supposed. There are two kinds of prices: (1) taxes or
effluent fees, prices that would be imposed by the agent of the collective (for example, the EPA) on the basis of the harm caused; and (2)
tradable permits or quotas, which would be allocated by the agent of
the collective in predetermined quantities, and then traded freely for
money by those possessing such rights. My earlier analysis applies
quite directly to show the insuperable difficulty of implementing a
taxation scheme that charges appropriate prices and creates sound
regulatory incentives. Especially at the level of federal environmental
regulation, the informational demands to set appropriate taxes are
enormous. Even if private valuations can be estimated in acceptable
ways, 7 the agency costs introduced by exchanging money for environmental harm are likely to swamp any desirable effect on private
incentives in using collective goods.
"- See, e.g., Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading Why Is This
ThoroughbredHobbled?, 13 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 217. 219 (1988) ("Successful resolution
of increasingly complex local and global air quality problems requires greater emphasis on decentralized trading programs and less on omniscient bureaucracy."). For a
more general argument in favor of market incentives in environmental protection, see
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw: The Democratic
CaseforMarketIncentives, 13 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 171, 173-88 (1988).
9 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 95, at 172-88 (describing the current deficiencies in the command and control regulatory strategy and recommending instead
marketable permits).
97 This may be done, for instance, by gathering market data on the premia demanded by persons in exchange for exposure to certain health risks. But see PETER
DORMAN, MARKETS AND MORTALITY 51-106 (1996) (describing and critiquing various
ways of inferring willingness to accept varying degrees of risk of death from market
behavior, such as wage premia for risky occupations).
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As for tradable quotas or permits, observe first that the performance of such a scheme depends upon the first-stage decision regarding the permissible overall level of the activity. Now this is, of course,
dependent upon some means of assessing individual and collective
values. The valuation problem is not avoided but confronted head on
in choosing aggregate levels of harm or emissions. It may be (and
often is) 98 asserted that the argument for tradable quotas is purely
second-best: Given any particular aggregate-level target, the cheapest
way of achieving that level is through tradable quotas. My theory
suggests, however, a fundamental limitation on the applicability of
such a rationale. The value of sanctions is in allowing the agent of
the collective to stop harmful uses as soon as the harm is perceived
and early enough for the sanctions to be effective in labeling the
violator. If a user not only has a quota, but also has a quota that by
right she may increase via money exchange, then the decision already
has been made not only that the type of use is permissible, but also
that any level of emissions caused thereby is permissible as well, as
long as the user pays for the increase. This suggests that tradable
emission quotas are appropriate only for those emissions that are
customary and known to be on balance in the collective interest,
regardless of the level of emissions. As a consequence, the case for
tradable sulfur dioxide permits under the Clean Air Act's acid-rain
program9 may depend very strongly on the fact that the entities
covered by the program are regulated public utilities, the actions of
which traditionally have been certified by an agent of the collective as
being in the local public interest.'00 The deregulation of the electricutility industry is therefore of direct relevance on this account to the
case for tradable permits: Without regulatory oversight of the activity,
both the way and level at which it is conducted must be newly evaluated.
CONCLUSION
Composed as an alternative to grand theories of incommensurable goods and values, my argument has posited an underlying socio-

98 See, e.g., T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONs TRADING (1985).

99See42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994).
'00The incentives for rate-of-return regulated electric utilities created by the
tradable emission-allowance program under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments are analyzed in Don Fullerton et al., Sulfur Dioxide Compliance of a Regulated Utility, 34J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 32 (1997).
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economic, functional explanation for the widespread condemnation
of certain kinds of explicit money exchange. Trust is of enormous
value to a market economy, but trust cannot be learned unless there
are some relationships that are insulated from exchange in the common medium. Just as we all gain by having among us those who know
how to cooperate, to keep their word, and to lend a helping hand, so
too do we all gain by having among us those who care for and understand the natural environment, and will perform the promise of
stewardship implicit in private ownership. Pricing a service is indeed
a way to see that it is not undervalued. But attaching money prices to
some services defeats their social and economic purpose. Instead, we
regulate uses and relationships, sanctioning those that fall far from
the range of the permissible, both to facilitate nonlegal means of
control and regulation, and to ensure that the incentive to monitor
the collective welfare does not become an invitation for rent-seeking
by private actors and public agents.
These themes necessarily have been developed incompletely
here. Still, I hope to have shown at least that the explanation for
"incommensurability" rests not on highly abstract theories of individual choice or aggregate welfare, but on the concrete benefits of social
and environmental cooperation.
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